It is common for both the practicioner and academic community to consider the economic, political and social costs faced by combatant and non-combatant actors in the contexts of internal armed conflicts to identify the probability of a peace negotiation to occur. However, we know little about the dimensions of these costs. This article reviews both the official academic production on the different costs incurred by the colombian society and economy in the course of the country's prolonged internal armed conflict. It identifies how these costs have been quantified by different authors and institutions and discusses some of the limitations of these studies. The article suggests that it would be convenient to specify the affected social sectors or productive activities at risk in order to fine tune our ability to identify, enlist, and mobilize crucial peacebuilding partners.

armed conflict --- costs --- peace building --- Colombia

The renewed importance of mining in the Peruvian economy and the expectation of new investments in the sector have nourished the hope of reducing the poverty levels and overcoming political instability. That is why Peru maintains itself within orthodox politics and economy. Recent governments have kept a strict macroeconomic stability and, since 2001, they have encouraged a political agenda that stresses decentralisation, participation, and collaboration between private initiatives and public institutions. However, the increase of conflicts around mining operations questions the capacity of mining to promote development. I contend that in the context of a state with important limitations, the simplistic implementation of the new political agenda generates a new form of “curse of the resources” that consists of two changes: a) the appearance of new political actors; b) the emergence of a sub-national level as the crucial space in which this “curse” is manifested.

Peru --- mining --- resource curse --- decentralisation --- social movements --- conflict.

This article explains how the emerald and coca economies are ingrained in the Colombian conflict. We interpret the mechanisms that generate conflict or peace, order or disorder. Our analysis is supported on Richard Snyder’s model which offers analytical elements to understand how violent reaction and raw products exports correlate with each other. We conclude that the described economies have had very violent courses but have also opened up specific paths to peace, of which the prerequisites are the denial of democratic freedom, privatization of public economies, and the endorsement and strengthening of illegal or semi-legal actors. We also make a critical exam of Snyder’s model.

drug traffic --- emeralds --- Colombian armed conflict --- peace --- privatization of security.

This article describes the mechanisms through which the transition from banana to oil palm plantations in Zona Bananera, Magdalena, has been influential in forced displacement. Therefore it adds to the debate about the paths between resources and conflict in the literature on political economy of internal armed conflicts. The outcome of this qualitative research suggests that in the case in question the following “pathways” have operated: 1. The absence of a strong institutional presence has permitted the collection of extortions by illegal armed groups allowing their financing and generating forced displacement as a consequence of the threats; 2. The transition from banana to palm extraction reduced the intensity of manual labor and food security unleashing displacement processes; and 3. The institutional incentives for oil palm exploitation have promoted the usurpation of land by illegal armed actors who provoke the displacement in order to acquire land for their cultivation.

political economy --- armed conflict --- forced displacement --- oil palm --- banana --- Zona Bananera