How to Leave a Stable Iraq: Building On Progress
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080901faessay87503/stephen-biddle-michael-e-o-hanlon-kenneth-m-pollack/how-to-leave-a-stable-iraq.html
By Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and Kenneth M. Pollock
Reviewed by Col. Norvell B. DeAtkine, U.S. Army (ret.)

Writing in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, three authors from the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution posit that the situation in Iraq is improving and claim that with the right strategy the United States can ultimately withdraw its troops without sacrificing stability. The authors’ thrust is that the last 18 months have brought fundamental changes:

• The security situation has improved dramatically.
• Political developments have undermined all the major armed militias.
• Iraq is emerging from a war zone into a primarily political battlefield.

In this new environment, the writers envision a new set of problems requiring another shift in strategy. Although maintaining that “simply staying the course” will no longer suffice, they emphasize there should be only a “modest” drawdown of troops until after forthcoming provincial and later national elections.

The two biggest changes in the Iraqi situation – improvement of the Iraqi security forces and the lessening of sectarian tensions – have allowed the emergence of a more positive political dynamic. Even so, the most crucial challenge for the al-Maliki government will be the lengthy reconciliation and integration of the various Sunni anti-insurgent groups such as the Sons of Iraq and Awakening Councils. Al-Maliki is wary of allowing the Sunni Arabs a vehicle to regain power, while the Sunnis are afraid that the Shi’a majority will reduce them to a lowly status akin to the one that Sunni governments previously imposed on the Shi’a.

The authors depict as the second obstacle to stability the massive problem of refugees and displaced people. They consequently advocate a large-scale government effort to resettle displaced persons and rebuild communities, a task unfortunately complicated by a third problem – the government's administrative inefficiency. For example, the best hospitals in Baghdad have only sporadic air-conditioning. (Iraqis tell the reviewer that despite Iraq's huge oil revenues, the hospitals lack funding for generators and must rely on the national electrical grid, which provides power only four to six hours a day.)

As a way to energize the Iraqi government, the authors dismiss the idea that the United States should threaten withdrawal, which they regard as more likely to derail progress than advance it. They instead advocate continuing logistic and training support for the Iraqi security forces until they become fully capable of undertaking independent security operations. The authors also skewer those who refuse to credit the “surge” for the reduction of violence in Iraq and President Bush for leadership in the face of great opposition. What both the authors and detractors of the surge overlook, in the opinion of the reviewer, is the psychological dimension of strategy – in this case the clear affirmation that the United States would not cut and run.

The authors also fail to give sufficient credit to Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki, who, often wrongly belittled by Western pundits and portrayed in the Arab world as an Iranian stooge, has proven to be an astute leader, one unafraid to make bold moves. He has navigated a delicate path between the blandishments of Iran and the antagonism exuded by the Sunni Arab world, whose leaders routinely refer to his administration as the “Shi’a” government. At the same time he continues to traverse the minefields of Iraqi internal politics with dexterity and increasing confidence.