Experiencing the Other. How Expressivity and Value-based Perception Provide a Non-solipsistic Account of Empathy

Abstract

The problem of intersubjectivity has undergone multifold discussions in the philosophical, neuroscientific and psychological fields. Currently, the predominant theories in this ongoing debate contend that simulation or explicit reasoning must ground other-understanding. Yet this contention confines the subject to solipsistic self-projection without actual communication. I will provide an analysis suggesting that the roots of the concept of “empathy” reveal not only a dualistic inner-outer distinction but also an emerging reference to the bodily dimension. I claim that, by examining the verifiable-in-experience ideas of expressivity and dynamical value-based perception, the limits of the Theory Theory (TT) and of the Simulation Theory (ST) are resolved by means of a direct perceptual encounter that implies a unitary and never-isolated subject. I aim at showing that perception-based empathy provides an adequate basis for considering social dimensions from intersubjectivity to shared agency, since it allows for both direct embodied communication in cooperation and for the autonomy of agents involved in a collective domain.

Keywords

• Empathy
• Expressivity
• Embodiment
• Perception
• Collective Intentionality